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The Effect of State Banking Laws on
Holding Company Banks
DONALD M. BROWN
B ANK holding companies are subjectto avañety of
state banking laws that govern the extent of branch
banking and the number of banks that can be owned.
In responsetodifferent legal environments, significant
differences mayresult between the reported operating
results of independent banks and holding company
banks; as one consequence, bank financial ratios may
be affected significantly by state banking laws.’ These
financial ratios include measures of bank profitability,
efficiency and portfolio composition. Variables repre-
senting the characteristics of a bank’s market also may
be affected by state banking laws. These market vari-
ables include measures of market structure, size and
growth.
This article has two purposes. The first is to deter-
mine whether bank financial ratios and market vari-
ables are related to bank holding company ownership
or state laws limiting the number of banks owned by
any one holding company. The second is to determine
whether there are significant economic incentives
favoring the formation of multi-bank holding com-
panies over one-bank holding companies.
WHY DO BANK HOLDINC
COMPANIES EXIST?
Bank holding companies have specific advantages
oyer independent banks. They generally avoid being
tm
flank financial ratios haye been examined extensively by econ-
omists. Alengthy bibliographyofthis literature, including citations
through part of 1978, may he found in Ronald L. Schillereff,
MultihankHolding Company Pemformance (UMI Research Press,
1982).
As used herein, “state banking laws” refer specifically to state
laws governing branch banking and bank holding companies.
taxed on internal dividend payments, they can engage
in a widerrange ofnon-banking activities, they are less
hampered by geographical restrictions, and they can
raise funds by selling the commercial paper of the
parent corporation; they also can circumvent state
branching restrictions, These advantages are more im-
portant to some bank holding companies than to
others; likewise, they are more fully realized by own-
ing somebanks ratherthan others,. The economicvalue
ofthese advantages is reflected in the prices that hold-
ing companies offer for different banks,
If the costs associated with holding company own-
ership were low relative to the potential gains, all
banks would be owned by holding companies. This, of
course, is notthe case. Bank holding companies incur a
variety of costs: regulatory, administrative, even the
one-timecost ofgettingpermission to acquire banks. A
bank will remain independent until the discounted
present value of the advantages of holding company
ownership outweigh the discounted present value of
the costs.
Regardless of the number of banks they own, all
holding companies are subject to the same federal
regulations. Consequently, any gain realized by multi-
bank holding companies must be associated withown-
ership of the banks themselves; it is not related to the
profits associated with the permissible range of non-
bank activities.
THE EFEE-CT OF RE.CUL&TION ON
BANK HOLDING COMPANIE.S
Federal Regulatory Constraints-
Federal regulatory policy may prevent multi-bank
holding companies from owning certain banks, The
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Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System is
likelytoprevent an acquisitionby amulti-bankholding
company if that company already has a large market
share or ifthe acquisition would substantiallyincrease
concentration in a bankingmarket. TheBoard also may
prevent acquisitions or holding company formations
for reasons other than competition. For example, it
may rule unfavorablyifthe holding company is thought
to be financially weak. Consequently, some banks may
be either independent or owned by one-bank holding
companies solely because ofactual or anticipated reg-
ulatory denials.
The Adaptation of Bank Holding
Companies- to State Banking Law’s
State banking laws also may affect bank ownership.
Table 1 categorizes states according to their restric-
tions oil branching and bank holding companies and
shows the distribution of the 50 states among these
categories. If the legal constraints imposed by state
laws are binding, banks and bank holding companies
will attempt to circumvent them.2 Multi-bank holding
2
We cannot know the eRect ofa constraint with certainty until it is
removed; however, the existence ofunit banksand one-bankhold-
ing companies in states that allow both statewide branching and
multi-bank holding companies is strong circumstantial evidence
that state banking laws are not binding on all organizations.
In unit-banking and limited-branching states that
permit multi-bank holding companies, bank holding
companies are not constrained to own only one bank;
each one-bank holding company does so by choice.
Because both one-bank and multi-bank holding com-
panies exist simultaneously in these states, their own-
ers must face different incentives. Consequently, they
may own different types of banks or manage their
banks in ways that produce different operating results
and portfolio compositions.
Any prohibition of branching is more effective if
multi-bank holding companies also are prohibited.3
Even though some holding companies in states pro-
hibiting both types of organizations might wishto own
onlyone bank, others would choose toown more banks
in the absence of the constraint. The constrained and
unconstrained one-bank holding companies in these
states may have different financial and market charac-
teristics,
In states that allow statewide branclnng, both
branch banks and multi-bank holding companies
‘Table 1 offers some eirenmstantial evidence, Noneofthe 24 states
that allow statewide branching prohibit multi-bank holding com-
panies. Apparently, once banksare allowed to branch throughout a
state, preventing holding companies from owning more than a
single bank is not an effective constraint.
companies represent one way to circumvent the state
branching restrictions described in table 1.
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potentially can achieve the same geographic scope.4
Consequently, multi-bank holding companies and
one-bank holding companies that own branch banks
maynot displaysignificant differencesin terms oftheir
financial and market characteristics, On the other
hand, there may be significant differences between a
one-bank holding company that owns a branch bank
and another in the same state that owns a unit bank.
Distortions of Reported Financial Results
Differences in reported financial characteristics do
not necessarily reflect actual operating differences.
Comparisons of the financial ratios of unit and branch
banks, whether locatedin the same or different states,
are distorted by financial reporting conventions. Be-
cause the financial results of a bank’s branches are
aggregated for reporting purposes, differences be-
tween the reported financial characteristics of branch
and unit banks may be due partly to lumping different-
sized branches in different locations into a single re-
porting entity. The problem exists if the state allows
limited or statewide branching, It is compounded in
branching states that allow multi-bank holding com-
panics because a multi-bank holding company (subject
to regulaton- approval) may choose either to charter a
subsidiary bank separately or make it the bramich of
another subsidiary bank. Thus, the reported financial
characteristics will depend upon the permissible legal
forms.
Ls There an Economic Incentive for
Multi—Bank Holding Companies?
Although it might be argued that the existence of
multi-bank holding companies is prima facie evidence
that some companies have an economic incentive to
own more than one bank, multi-bank holding com-
panies could arise by chance. Assume, for example,
4
Federal law effectively prevents interstate branching and inter-
statebanking expansiotsby holding companies. States can extend a
statutory invitation to out-of-state bank holding companies, hut
only a handful actnally have done so. Alaska allows ont-of-state
companies to buy Alaskan banks that have operated for at least
three years. Maine, Massachusetts and New York permit holding
companies from states that reciprocate; the Massachusetts law
limits reciprocity to only New England states, Washington allows
out-of-state holding companies to purchase banks in the state that
are in financial difficulty. Finally, Delaware and South Dakota
allow out-of-state holding cosnpanies to own special-purpose
banks, which are operated under rules that prevent them from
actively soliciting deposits from the public. (Information on these
statelaws was provided by the staffofthe BoardofGovernors ofthe
Federal Reserve System.)
that owning two or more banks conferred no net gainto
abank holding company. It should then make no differ-
ence whether a bank is owned by a one-bank or multi-
bank holding company. Even if banks with certain
observable characteristics typically are owned by bank
holding companies, any specific holding company
could hold eitherone or several ofthese banks. In this
example, whether a bank is owned by a holding com-
pany depends upon the bank’s own observed financial
and market characteristics alone.
Assume, now, that some bank holding companies
derive some net advantage from owning several banks.
These advantages may arise from the nature ofeither
the bank or the bank holding company; they are dis-
tinct, however, from the advantages realized by one-
bank holding companies. Under this assumption, mul-
ti-bank holding companies would own some banks that
would not be owned by one-bank holding companies.
Therefore, abank’s chance ofbeing owned by a holding
company woulddepend on state laws regarding multi-
bank holding companies, aswell as its individualfinan-
cial and market characteristics.
We cannot say a priori that there are economic in-
centives for some bank holding companies to own
several banks, The issue must be decided on the basis
of empirical evidence. Although a variety ofempirical
tests could be chosen, thetests usedin this article focus
on the relationship between bank holding company
ownership and abank’s financialand marketcharacter-
istics in unit-banking states.°
EMPIRICAL TESTS OF THREE
PROPOSITIONS ABOUT HOLDING
CO!-1PANY BANKS IN UNIT-BANKING
STATES
Three testable propositions regarding certain bank
characteristics in unit-banking states can be derived
3
Sinee this study is confined to asample ofbanks from unit-banking
states, it doesnot provide direct evidence on whether multi-bank
holding companies circumvent state branching restrictions. A
worthwhile direction for future research would be to expand the
sample to include banks from states that allow limited and
statewide branch banking. Empirical tests on theexpanded sample
could determine whether the incentives of multi-hank holding
companies are reduced oreliminated in states having less stringent
restrictions on branching.
This study also does not explore the nature of the economic
incentive to ownseveral bank~.The evidence presented inthe next
section indicates that, whether the incentive arises from cost
advantages, control over priceorsomeother source, it isapparent-
ly qeiite strong. Another worthwhile direction l’or future research
would lse to investigate its source.
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2. The financial and market characteristics of banks
owned by one-bank holding companies will differ
from thoseofother banks; they will dependon state
laws regarding multi-bank holding companies.
3’ A bank is more likely to be owned by a holding
company if the state permits multi-bank holding
companies-
Methodology and Sampie Characteristics
These propositions are tested by probit analysis to
estimate theeffect ofcertain independent variables on
the likelihood that a bank is owned by a bank holding
company.6 The following are the dependent variables
in threeprobitregression models, each ofwhich repre-
sents a choice between alternative forms ofownership:
Y
1
= 1, if a bank is owned by a multi-bank holding
company,
= 0, otherwise;
= 1, if a bank is owned by a one-bank holding
company,
= 0, otherwise;
= 1, if a bank is owned by either a one-bank or
multi-bank holding company,
0, otherwise.
The sample on which the probit models are esti-
mated consists of all insured commercial banks in six
western and midwesternunit-banking states. The sam-
ple is divided into two subsamples of three states,
States in one subsample permit multi-bank holding
companies; states in the other prohibit them.7 Any
holding company that owns two or more banks in any
state is defined as a multi-bank holding company; the
others are one-bank holding companies.
Four probit regression equations are estimated for
each of the years 1978 and 1981, The Y1 model is
6
Probit analysis is a non-linear estimation technique frequently
used when a model’s dependent variable represents the choice
between two alternatives, For explanations of the probit model,
see Robert 5, Pindyck and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Econometric
Models and Economic Forecasts, 2nd ed, (McGraw-Hill Rook
Company, 1981), pp. 280—87; and George C. Judge and others,
The Theory and Practice of Econometrics (John Wiley and Sons,
1980), pp. 591—92.
7
ln the six states used in this study, Colorado, Missouri and Wyo-
mingpermit multi-bankholding companies; Kansas, Nebraska and
Oklahoma prohibit them.
estimated on the subsample permitting multi-bank
holding companies; the Y2 model is estimated sepa-
rately on each subsample; and the Y3 model is esti-
mated on the full sample.
independent Variables
Table 2 defines the independent variables used in
the probitmodels and reports their summary statistics
for both 1978 and 1981,8 The same financial variables
have been used in many empirical studies that have
investigated differences between independent and
holding company banks. These variables were con-
structed from financial data in annual bank call reports
and income statements forthe yearsendingDecember
31, 1978, and December 31, 1981. The variables
measuring market characteristics were computed by
aggregating bank financial data across banking mar-
kets, which were defined as either Standard Metro-
politan Statistical Areas (SIVISAs) or counties (in the
case of counties not part of SMSAs),
A comparison of the variables’ means in 1978 and
1981 shows that theratiosofoperatingexpense andnet
federal hinds sold to total assets (ROE and RNFFS)
were markedly higher in 1981, and the ratio of total
loans to total assets (RTL) was lower in 1981. These
differences may be explained by the economic condi-
tions prevailing in 1981, when interest rates reached
historically high levels andloan demand (partly reflec-
tive ofinterestrates) was low. Increases in themeans of
dummy variables SMSA and MBHC between 1978
and 1981 indicateincreases inthe proportion ofsample
banks located in SMSAs and states that allow multi-
bank holding companies -
Full Sample
ROE, RN! 0.41 —0.41 —
CR, SMSA —0.42 —0.61 —0.50
CR, DCRMBHC —— 0,41







ROE, RN! —0.48 —
CR, SMSA —0.43 —0.63
CR, DCRMBHC ——
MBHC. DCRMBHC — —
REQ, RNFFS — 0.42
Full Sample
from the preceding discussion:
1. The financial and market characteristics of banks
owned by multi-bank holding companies will differ
from those of other banks.
8
Some independent variables were considered for inclusion in the
models but were dropped because they were highly correlated
with other independent variables- In each subsample and in the
full sample, most simple correlations between included indepen-
dent variables were less than 0.20 in absolute value in both 1978
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A positive (negative) sign on an independent vari-
able’s coefficient indicates that higher values of the
variable increase (decrease) the likelihood that a bank
is owned by the specified type of bank holding com-
pany. The coefficientofTAis expected to be positivein
the Y1 model. This expectation is based not on theory,
but on previous empirical study.9 It assumes that as a
bank’s size increases, eeteris paribus, the likelihood
that the bank is owned by a multi-bank holding com-
pany also increases.
No predictions can be made as to the signs of other
coefficients in the Y1 and Y2 models. Although many
°Multi-bankholding companies tend to own largerbanks. Manyof
these organizations own lead banksthat are among astate’s largest
banks. Subsidiary banksother thanlead banksoftenarelarger than
theaverage bank in their markets and seldom areamong thevery
small banks.
empirical studies have investigated the relationship
between holding company ownership and bank
financialratios, theyhave potentially important weak-
nesses, including a nearly universal failure to control
for the potential effects ofdiverse state banking laws.
Moreover, they frequently have produced conflicting
results.
The variables MBHCand DCRMBHC are included
in only the Y3 model.10 As the following section ex-
plains, the estimated coefficientofMBHC is predicted
‘°Inthe subsample on which the Yi and first Y
2
models were
estimated, MBHC took on thevalue of1 bra
11
observations, while
DCRMI3HC took on thevalue of 1 or zero, In the subsample on
whichthe second Y
2
model was estimated, both variables took on
the value of zero for all observations,
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to be positive, and the estimated coefficient of
DCIIMBHC is predicted to be negative.
The Criteriafor Accepting or Rejecting the
Propositions
The first proposition is “accepted” (in the statistical
sense) if the likelihood ratio of the Y1 estimation is
statistically significant in both 1978 and 1981. This
would indicate that, in unit-banking states that permit
multi-bankholding companies, banks owned by multi-
bankholdingcompanies differfrom other bankson the
basis of their financial and market characteristics.
For the first proposition to be accepted, neither the
sizes, statistical significance, nor the signs of the esti-
mated coefficients need to be invariant over the two
years. Coefficients may differ between 1978 and 1981
because changing economic conditions affected multi-
bank holding company subsidiaries and other banks
differently; because the modest increase in the total
number of banks and/or the proportionately large in-
crease in multi-bank holding company subsidiaries
occurring in the subsample between 1978 and 1981
(see tables 3a and 3b) altered the compositions of the
two groups of banks; because the financialand market
characteristics ofthetwo groups ofbanks are following
different long-term trends; or for a combination of
these reasons. None ofthese possibilities would obvi-
ate the conclusion that banks owned by multi-bank
holding companies differ from other banks.
The second proposition is accepted if, inboth 1978
and 1981, the likelihood ratios of the two Y2 eStima-
tions are statistically significant and if the signs or
statistical significance ofthe coefficients differbetween
the two estimations. The formerwould show that one-
bank holdingcompanybanks differfrom otherbanks in
their financialand market characteristics, regardless of
whether multi-bank holding companies arepermitted.
The latter would show that the financial and market
characteristics ofone-bankholding company banks de-
pend onwhether a state allows or prohibits multi-bank
holding companies. Differences in financial and mar-
ket characteristics between one-bank holding com-
pany banks in the two subsamples would be the result
ofdifferences between constrained and unconstrained
holding companies in the states that prohibit multi-
bankholdingcompanies. Like thefirstproposition, the
second proposition is not refuted by different coef-
ficient estimates in the 1978 and 1981 estimations.
The coefficients in the Y1 and Y2 estimations can be
compared in the same manner. If, in states that allow
multi-bank holding companies, the signs or statistical
significance of the coefficients differ between the Y1
andY2 estimations, then banksowned by the twotypes
ofholding companies have different financialand mar-
ket characteristics.
The third proposition depends on the coefficient of
MBHC in theY3 estimation. It is accepted ifthe esti-
mated coefficient is positive and significantly greater
than zero inboth 1978and 1981. A positivesign would
indicate that, given its financialand market character-
istics, a bank is more likely to be owned by a bank
holding company (either a one-bank or multi-bank
holding company) if it is located in the unit-banking
states that permit multi-bank holding companies.
The interaction variable DCRMBHC is included in
the Y3 model to accountfor the possible effect offeder-
al regulation on the likelihood of holding company
ownership. The Board of Governors is more likely to
prevent acquisitions by multi-bankholding companies
in highly concentrated markets(DCR = 1) than in less
concentrated markets (DCR = 0); therefore, thecoef-
ficient of DCRMBHC is predicted to be negative in
both 1978 and 1981.
Empirical Results
Y1 Estimations — The results ofthe Y1 estimations
are reported in column 1 of tables 3a and 3b. Both
likelihood ratios are highly significant, indicating that
banks owned by multi-bank holding companies differ
from other banks in terms oftheindependent variables
included in the Y1 model. Moreover, most estimated
coefficients also are statistically significant, which indi-
catesthatthe correspondingindependent variables are
different for multi-bank holding company subsidiaries
than for other banks -
Several coefficients had the same sign and were
statistically significant in both years. The estimated
coefficients ofTA are positive and statistically signifi-
cant, as predicted. The results also show that, even
after controlling for the influence of bank size (TA),
banks owned by multi-bank holding companies are
located more often in metropolitan areas and less con-
centrated banking markets. The positive coefficients
on the interaction variable DCRTA imply that, ceteris
paribus, a larger bank in a highly concentrated market
is more likely to be owned by a multi-bank holding
company than a smaller bank in the same market.
Other coefficients differed between the two years.
In 1978, banks owned by multi-bank holding com-
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panics devoted alarger share oftheir portfolios to loans
and sold fewernetfederal funds as aproportion oftotal
assets, while theirratiosofequity to totalassets did not
vary significantlyfrom other banks. Onthe other hand,
in 1981, these banks had significantly lower ratios of
equity to totalassets, whilethe shareoftheir portfolios
devotedto loans and net federal hindssold did not vary
significantly from other banks -
~2 Estimations — The Y2 estimations are reported in
columns 2and 3 oftables 3a and3b. The highly signifi-
cant likelihood ratios indicate that, regardless of state
policy toward multi-bank holding companies, banks
owned by one-bank holding companies differ from
other banks.
In 1978, the estimated coefficients of the financial
variables had uniformly opposite signs and statistical
significance in columns 1 and 2 (see table 3a). The
differences between the columns were fewer in 1981.
Banks ownedby one-bankholding companies earned a
higher return on total assets than otherbanks in 1981,
whereas the return of banks owned by multi-bank
holding companies did not vary significantly from
other banks; furthermore, multi-bank holding com-
pany subsidiariestended tobe larger thanother banks,
and one-bank subsidiaries tended to be smaller (see
table 3b), The findings indicate that one-bank and
multi-bank holding companies had different financial
ratios in the states that permit multi-bank holding
companies.
The estimated coefficients of the market variables
are similar in both 1978 and 1981. In column 2 of the
tables, the estimated coefficients of market concentra-
tion (CR) are positive and significant, whereas in col-
umn 1 the coefficients of CR are negative and signifi-
cant. This difference implies that banksowned by one-
bank holding companies tend to be located in more
concentrated markets, while banks owned by multi-
bank holding companies tend to be located in less
concentrated markets. The estimated coefficients of
the other market variables in column 2 are not statisti-
cally significant.
A comparison of column 3 with columns 1 and 2 in
the tables shows that banks owned by one-bank hold-
ing companies in unit-banking states that prohibit
multi-bank holding companies exhibit similarities to
both types ofholding companies in the other subsam-
ple ofstates. In column 3, the estimated coefficients of
all financial variables, except ROE, are statistically
significant at the 5 percent confidence level or better.
In 1978, they tookthe sign ofthe estimated coefficient
from column 1 or 2 that had the t-statistic of larger
absolute value. In 1981, this was the ease for the esti-
mated coefficients of RNI and TA; estimated coef-
ficients ofother financialvariables were either statisti-
cally insignificant in columns 1 and 2 (ROE, RTL,
RNFFS) orthey hadthe same sign (REQ). Apparently,
some holding companybanks inthe states thatprohibit
multi-bank holding companies have similar financial
characteristics to one-bank holding company sub-
sidiaries inthose states thatpermit multi-bank holding
companies; others have similarfinancialcharacteristics
to multi-bank holding company subsidiaries. This
interpretation is consistent with the characterization,
in the preceding section, of one-bank holding com-
panies in this subsample as either constrained or un-
constrained organizations.
Theestimated coefficientsofthe marketvariables do
not exhibit the same pattern. In column 3, only the
negative estimated coefficients of the dummy variable
representing metropolitan markets (SMSA) and the
market growth variable (MKGR) were statistically sig-
nificant in both 1978 and 1981. The latter was not
significant in either of the other estimations, and the
former was significant hut positive in the Y1 estima-
tions. In 1981, the estimated coefficient ofCR in col-
umn 3 was statistically significant, taking the positive
sign of the coefficient estimate in column 2.
Y3Estimations — The Y3 estimations are reported in
column 4oftables 3a and 3b. The high likelihood ratios
indicate that holding company banks, as a group, can
be distinguished from independent banks on the basis
of the independent variables. The positive and highly
significant estimate of the MBHC coefficient in both
1978 and 1981 strongly supports the thirdproposition.
The negative and highly significant estimate of the
DCRMBHC coefficient in both 1978 and 1981 con-
firms the prediction that, ceteris paribus, banks in
highly concentrated markets are less likely to be
owned by aholding company ifthe state permits multi-
bank holding companies -
CONCLUSIONS
One-bank and multi-bank holding company sub-
sidiaries in unit-banking states have different financial
and market characteristics than other banks. More-
over, the characteristics of the one-bank holding com-
panybanks depend on statelaws regarding multi-bank
holding companies. In addition, a bank is more likely
to be owned by a holding company in unit-banking
states that permit multi-bank holding companies than
in unit-banking states that prohibit them.
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These results clearly imply that empirical studies
that examine the effects ofholdingcompany ownership
on bank financial ratios should control for differences
among state banking laws, as well as for differences
between one-bankand multi-bankholding companies.
Though this may not appear to be a startling conclu-
sion, recent studies have failed to control for one or
both ofthesedifferences.5’ Future studies willhave to
do so iftheyare tocorrectlyassess the factorsthat cause
financial and market characteristics to differ among
banks.
“Johnson and Meinster, Jackson, and Mayne fail to control for
differences in state laws, while Fraas fails to account for differ-
ences between one-bank andmulti-bank holding companies; Rose
and Scott, and Graddyand Kyle, failon both counts. Only Mingo
accounted for both, by limiting his sample to nine unit-banking
states that permit multi-bank holding companies and excluding
suhsidiary banks that were owned by one-bank holding com-
panies. Bylimiting hissample in thisway, theauthor also avoided
the aggregation problem with comparing the financial results of
unit and branch banks. See Rodney D. Johnson and David R.
Meinster,~‘ThePerformance ofBank Holding CompanyAcquisi-
tions: A Multivariate Analysis,”Journal ofBusiness (April 1975),
pp. 204—12; William Jackson, “Multibank Holding Companies
and Bank Behavior” (Working Paper75-1, Federal Reserve Bank
of Richmond, July 1975); Lucille S. Mayne, “A Comparative
Study of Bank Holding Company Affiliates and Independent
Banks, 1969—1972, “Journal ofFinance (March 1977),pp. 147—58;
Arthur C. Fraas, The Performance of Individual Bank Holding
Companies, StaffEconomic Studies 84 (Board ofGovernors ofthe
Federal Reserve System, 1974); Peter S. Rose and William L.
Scott, “The Performance of Banks Acquired by Holding Com-
panies, -- Review of Business and Economic Research (Spring
1979), pp. 18-37;Duane B. Graddyand Reuben Kyle, III, “Aflili-
ated Bank Performance and the Simultaneity of Financial Deci-
sion-Making, “Journal ofFinance (September 1980), pp. 951—57;
and JohnJ. Mingo, “Managerial Motives, Market Structures and
the Performance ofHolding CompanyBanks,”EconomicInquiry
(September 1976), pp. 411—24.
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